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FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
Constitutional Right or Lynch Law
NORMAN L. CHAPPLE
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the School of Police Administration, Michigan State University where he recently received an M.S.
degree. He was first appointed to the Derby Borough Police force in 1952. In 1959 he was granted a
leave of absence and studied law at the University of London, receiving an LL.B. degree in June 1962.
His study in this country was a Fulbright Travel Award.-EDIroR.
The traditional Anglo-American freedom of
assembly has in some recent instances degenerated
into a form of censorship by mob violence which
could become a serious threat to public order on
both sides of the Atlantic. In order to avoid the
necessity, in the interests of public safety, for
further legal restriction of the freedom it is essential that the police of both nations take strong,
but sensible and just, action to protect individuals
or groups in the exercise of this fundamental
constitutional right. Firm police action, however,
will be completely ineffective unless supported by
the courts who are under a moral duty to impose
exemplary punishment on those who would seek to
abuse the freedom of assembly. Only by the stringent application of the existing law, by law enforcement agencies and courts alike, can this facet
of civil rights be properly safeguarded.
THE COMMON LAW
Certain limited but well established restrictions
of the freedom of assembly have long been recognised in both England and the United States.
Breach of the peace, obstruction and criminal
conspiracy, for instance, are common law misdemeanours which, together with statutory riot
under the Riot Act, 1714, are offences which are
accepted in England as necessary limitations of
the rights of individuals to gather for the purpose
of expressing themselves in public. In many American cities and states a similar effect is achieved
by the enforcement of the laws concerning trespass,
disorderly conduct, obstruction ordinances, and
ordinances requiring a permit for any public
meeting.
It is only pertinent here, however, to consider
the main limitation of the freedom of assembly,

namely the law concerning lawful and unlawful
assemblies. The common law concerning "unlawful assemblies" is common to both countries and is
well defined. The police, therefore, have no difficulty in taking appropriate action where an assembly is unlawful per se. An "unlawful assembly"
can be said to exist where three or more persons
assemble to commit a breach of the peace; or
assemble in such a manner that reasonable persons
are caused to fear a breach of the peace; or assemble
to commit a crime. Although this definition of the
English common law is generally applicable in the
United States, some jurisdictions have statutes
which either define the offence of "unlawful assembly" or provide a specific penalty for the
common law offence. It will be sufficient if the
facts established in any particular case constitute
an offence within the statutory definition, but the
statutes will generally be interpreted in the light
of the common law definition. 1 All persons joining
in or encouraging the proceedings are criminally
liable,2 but the question of what constitutes encouragement is a matter for the jury. For instance,
it has been held that mere presence does not constitute encouragement, but if unexplained, it may
be evidence for the consideration of the jury. In
contrast, it was decided in one American case that
presence at a meeting is sufficient evidence of
participation in an "unlawful assembly" if, in
fact and in law, the assembly was "unlawful". 4
It is noteworthy that an assembly will become
an "unlawful assembly" if the speakers or audience
I People v Most, 27 N.E. 970, 128 N.Y. 108, 113,
26 Am S.R. 458.
2 R. v Atkinson (1869) 11 Cox 330.
3
R. v Coney (1882) 8 Q.B.D. 552
, People ex rel. Mertig v Johnston, 62 N.Y.S. 2d.
429, 186 Misc. 1041
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merely act in such a way "as to give firm and
rational men, having families and property there,
reasonable ground to fear a breach of the peace."'
A well founded fear in the minds of firm and courageous persons, of threatened danger to the public
peace, is required in the United States.6
An "unlawful assembly" becomes a "rout" as
soon as it starts from its meeting place to carry out
the purpose for which it assembled, and a "rout",
in turn, becomes a common law "riot" as soon as
it begins to carry out that purpose with a show of
violence. Apart from the statutory provisions in
some American states, "unlawful assembly",
"rout" and "riot" are all common law misdemeanours, and the duties of the police on such
occasions are dearly to disperse the gathering and
arrest the ringleaders, together with anyone offering resistance. There is no constitutional right to
continue the meeting.
THE CASE LAW
Permit ordinances and proprietory rights apart,
there is generally no power to prohibit a public
meetingin advance. The law concerning "unlawful
assembly" has been outlined above and the legal
question which must now be considered is whether
a meeting which is lawful in itself may become
unlawful simply because it may cause hostile
listeners, who object to the purpose of the participants in a particular meeting, to break the peace?
In order to answer this question it is necessary to
summarise the law on this point.
The short answer is that if a public meeting is
held in a lawful and peaceable manner it does not
become unlawful merely because disturbances are
caused by hostile onlookersY If, however, the
speaker speaks or otherwise conducts himself in
such a manner as to provoke or incite other people
to commit a breach of the peace he commits an
offence which renders him liable to arrest and
places the meeting in the category of an "unlawful
assembly".8
One somewhat controversial case in England is
authority for saying that if a policeman reasonably
apprehends a breach of the peace he can request
the speaker to desist, and stop the meeting.9 In
5 R. v Vincent (1939) 9 C. & P. 109.
6 State v Butterworth, 142 A.57, 104 N.J. Law 79,
58 7A.L.R. 744
Beatty v Gillbanks (1882) 9 Q.B.D. 308.
8
Wise v Dunning (1902) 1 K.B. 167, 71 L.J.K.B.
165
9Duncan v Jones (1936) 1 K.B. 218

these circumstances, refusal on the part of the
speaker to desist constitutes obstruction of a police
officer in the execution of his duty, thus rendering
the speaker liable to arrest.10
The American view is that peaceable assembly
for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime and
the right to free assembly cannot be abridged
merely because persons threaten to stage a riot, or
because peace officers believe or are afraid that
breaches of the peace will occur if the rights are
exercised." It is the generally accepted rule that
freedom of assembly may be restricted only to
prevent grave and immediate danger to interests
which the state may lawfully protect.12 Thus, when
clear and present danger of disorder or other immediate threat to public safety appears, the power
of the state to punish is obvious. It was under this
view that the Supreme Court upheld the conviction
of Irving Feiner for disorderly conduct in Syracuse,
N.Y.13 This was a 6 to 3 decision, however, and the
circumstances of the case were such that it may be
interpreted, as Mr. Justice Black said in his dissenting judgment, as approving:
a simple and readily available technique by
which cities and states can with impunity subject all speeches, political or otherwise, on
streets or elsewhere, to the supervision and
14
censorship of the local police.
The decision certainly appears to have broad
connotations to the effect that a restive audience,
and threats of violence towards the speaker by at
least one onlooker, at a public meeting are sufficient to justify its termination by the police.
Tan

CASES AND Tmm

Emcrs

The leading English case on the point in issue
is Beatly v Gillbanks, decided in 1882." The circumstances in that case were that the newly
founded Salvation Army was in the habit of assembling and marching peaceably through the
streets of Weston-super-Mare. A rival body of
townspeople who objected to these activities and
called themselves the "Skeleton Army", commenced to hold their own parades for the express
purpose of obstructing the progress of the Salva10Ibid.

" Sellers v Johnson C.C.A., Iowa 163 F. 2d. 877,
332 U.S. 581
"West Virginia State Board of Education v
Barnette, Tex., 63 S.Ct. 1178, 319 U.S. 624; U.S. v
Korner D.C. Cal. 56 F. Supp. 242
1Feiner v People of New York (1951) 340 U.S. 315
14Ibid, at p. 323
15Supra.
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tion Army marchers. The resulting disturbances
in the streets led to the local magistrates binding
over the leaders of the Salvation Army to keep
the peace. Upon subsequently holding another
procession through the streets the Salvation Army
leaders were arrested and convicted of "unlawful
assembly". On appeal, the Divisional Court reversed the conviction for, in the words of Judge
Field:
There was nothing in their conduct when they
were assembled together which was either tumultous or against the peace. But it is said that
the conduct pursued by them on this occasion
was such as, on several previous occasions, had
produced riots and disturbances of the peace,
and terror to the inhabitants; and that the
appellants, knowing that when they assembled
together such consequences would again arise,
are liable to this charge. Now I entirely concede
that everyone must be taken to intend the
natural consequences of his acts, and it is clear
to me that if this disturbance of the peace was
the natural consequence of the acts of the
appellants they would be liable, and the justices
would have been right in binding them over.
But the evidence set forth in this case does not
support this contention; on the contrary it
shows the disturbances were caused by other
people antagonistic to the appellants, and that
no acts of violence were committed by them ....
What has happened here is that an unlawful
organisation has assumed to itself the right to
prevent the appellants and others from lawfully
assembling together, and the finding of the
justices amounts to this, that a man may be convicted for doing a lawful act if he knows that his
doing it may cause another to do an unlawful
act. There is no authority for such a proposition.i6
Another reversal of conviction in similar circumstances took place on appeal in the case of
R. v Justices of Londonderry.7 Thus, it is well
established that a lawful assembly does not normally become unlawful merely because the
audience is hostile. On the other hand, if the words
or actions used by the participants at a public
assembly are such as to provoke a breach of the
peace as a natural consequence of those words or
acts, then such participants must be taken to have
1
0Beatty v Gillbanks, supra at p. 314
17
R. v Justices of Londonderry (1891) 28 L.R. Ir.
440

intended the consequences. This presumption was
alluded to by Judge Field in the Beatty v Gillbanks
judgment and was well illustrated twenty years
later in the case of Wise v Dunning.s Wise was an
ardent Protestant who had on several occasions
held meetings in a district of Liverpool which was
known to have a strong Roman Catholic population. Not content with merely expounding his
religious beliefs he used violent and provocative
language concerning the Pope, and spoke in very
derogatory terms about the Roman Catholic
Church. Breaches of the peace ensued, and Wise
was bound over by the stipendiary magistrate
to keep the peace. On appeal the Divisional Court
unanimously upheld the decision of the magistrate, distinguishing the present case from Beatty
v Gillbanks on the grounds that the appellant's
own conduct had been provocative and such as to
incite people to commit a breach of the peace.
Another variation of this type of situation was
present in the case of Duncan v Jones, in 1936.19
Mrs. Duncan was about to hold a meeting outside
a training center for unemployed when she was
forbidden to do so by Jones who was a police officer. The reason for the police officer's action was
that a disturbance in the training center about a
year earlier had been attributed to a speech made
by Mrs. Duncan, and it was feared that similar
results might occur again. Mrs. Duncan ignored
the police officer's request and upon attempting to
start the meeting she was arrested and charged
with "obstructing a police officer in the execution
of his duty" contrary to the Prevention of Crimes
Acts, 1871 and 1885. The prosecution did not
allege any obstruction of the highway, nor any
incitement or provocation to commit a breach of
the peace. Mrs. Duncan was convicted on the
grounds that she must have known the probable
consequence of her holding a meeting would be a
disturbance, and that she was not unwilling that
such a consequence should ensue; that Jones reasonably apprehended a breach of the peace and
it was, therefore, his duty to prevent the meeting;
and that by attempting to hold the meeting Mrs.
Duncan obstructed Jones in the execution of his
duty. The Divisional Court upheld the conviction,
but it seems probable that the application of this
decision should properly be limited to those cases
where it can be shown that the defendant has been
18Wise v Dunning, supra
"9Duncan v Jones, supra.
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responsible for causing a disorder on a previous
Occasion.

20

In the same year that the case of Duncan v Jones
was decided, but spurred by the troublesome
demonstrations of Fascist and similar organisations, an important statute was promulgated
concerning the conduct in England of public meetings and processions. This was the Public Order
Act, 1936. The first two sections of the act prohibit
quasi-military organisations and the wearing of
uniforms in connection with political objects.
The third section provides police powers for the
preservation of public order on the occasion of
public processions (i.e. power to direct the route
to be followed and to forbid entry to certain areas),
whilst the fourth and fifth sections prohibit the
possession of offensive weapons at public meetings
and processions, and also the use "in any public
place or at any public meeting" of "threatening,
abusive or insulting words or behaviour with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby
a breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned."'n
Although as a general rule, public meetings
cannot be prohibited in advance,22 section 3 of the
Public Order Act provides a procedure by which,
in certain circumstances, the police in London and
other urban districts may effectively prohibit all
processionsfor a period not exceeding three months.
Although this is a very useful police power, there
are adequate safeguards within the section to prevent its abuse, and in practice the power is seldom
used. The tendency is to control rather than prohibit public processions.
The fact that there is no absolute freedom of
assembly in England was reaffirmed by Lord
Hewart C. J. when, in upholding the conviction of
Mrs. Duncan in 1936, he commented, "English
law does not recognise any special right of public
2'
meeting for political or other purposes."
Even in the United States there is no absolute
right of assembly in the public highways, but there
have been strong indications that the courts are
beginning to favour the notion that a basic right
2

E. C. S. WADE AND G. GODFREY PmLLr s, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, (London: Longmans, Green & Co.,

1960), p. 534
21 Public Order Act, (1936) section 5.
2
Mention has already been made of American
permit ordinances, and similar bylaws exist in some
parts of England. The Trafalgar Square Act, 1844, for
instance, requires the consent of the Minister of Works
before
a public meeting can be held in Trafalgar Square.
2
1 Duncan v Jones, supra
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to speak and assemble in the public streets does
2
exist.
The principles underlying the decision in Beatty
v Gillbanks and Wise v Dunning undoubtedly apply
in the United States. The idea that a police officer's
apprehension of a likely breach of the peace is
sufficient ground to stop a lawful public meeting
(as illustrated by the Duncan v Jones decision),
however, is quite contrary to the American view
which prevailed without question until the Feiner
case in 1951. Even in upholding the conviction of
Irving Feiner, Chief Justice Vinson said:
We are well aware that the ordinary murmurings and objections of a hostile audience cannot
be allowed to silence a speaker, and are also
mindful of the possible danger of giving overzealous police officials complete discretion to
break up otherwise lawful public meetings. 25
In this particular case, however, there was no
evidence of actual violence on the part of anyone
participating in the meeting and the court itself
emphasised that Feiner was "neither arrested nor
convicted for the making or the content of
his speech. Rather it was the reaction which it
actually engendered.1 26 Thus, although there is
little doubt that Feiner could have been justifiably
arrested for the contents of his speech, this was not
in issue before the courts and the effect of the
decision appears to be that a police officer may
lawfully stop a public meeting if the audience is
inflamed and agitated, and if, as in this case, even
a single member of the audience threatens violence
towards the speaker.
The facts of the case were that Feiner, a young
student at Syracuse University, while addressing a
crowd including Negroes, through a loud-speaker
system from a box on the sidewalk, made derogatory remarks concerning various public officials
and indicated that Negroes should rise up in arms
and fight for equal rights. One onlooker, who was
accompanied by his wife and two children, spoke
to one of the two police officers present and threatened to remove the speaker from his platform
unless the police would stop him from speaking.
Other members of the audience had also seemed
to be angry, but Feiner ignored the requests of the
24Hague v C.I.O. 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Kunz v State
of New York 340 U.S. 290 (1951); see also GLENN
ABERNATh"y, THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOcIATION, (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press,

(1961), pp. 50-82.

15Feiner v People of New York, supra at p. 320
26 bid, pp. 319-320, per Chief Justice Vinson.
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police to stop speaking and was subsequently
arrested.
It appears, therefore, that the police in America,
as well as in England, have been afforded by the
courts considerable discretion in deciding when a
public meeting should be terminated.
In the light of this brief summary of the law
concerning the conduct of lawful assemblies consideration will now be given to some recent incidents where disturbances at lawful meetings
have placed the police in an almost intolerable
position and, so far as the English incidents were
concerned, caused expressions of extreme concern
from responsible members of the public. It was
following a succession of such occurrences that on
August 2, 1962, Sir Robert Cary, in the English
House of Commons, asked the Home Secretary if
l-e was aware that ". . . experience of the disorders
following recent meetings and processions of certain
organisations in London and Manchester shows
that there is a danger of a breakdown of law and
order on a wide scale if such incidents are rerepeated.. ."- On this occasion there was strong
agitation by Members for the amendment of the
Public Order Act, 1936, for the purpose of more
dearly defining the meaning of "abusive words"
in section 5. Support was urged for a Bill which
had been introduced on August 1, 1962, to add
after the words, ". . .abusive words or behaviour ... " the words, "or words inciting hatred
of any racial group of Her Majesty's subjects."N8
The Bill has not been passed, but it is significant
that many Members of Parliament feel that the
time has come to change the law in the interests of
public order and safety. Some of the incidents
which caused such deep anxiety will now be described.
English Disturbanwes. The summer of 1962 produced in England an almost unprecedented series
of public disturbances in connection with the open
air meetings of extremist political bodies, namely
the British National Party, the National Socialist
Movement, and the Union Movement. The
meetings of these groups were announced in advance, and all had as their principal theme the
dissemination of anti-Semitic and anti-Negroid
propaganda.
The first of these meetings at which a major
breach of the peace occurred was held in Trafalgar
Tnmxs, August 1962, p. 10, col. 6
"LoNoON
23 Ibid. August 1962, p. 6, col. 5

Square on Sunday, July 1, 1962, and was described
in one newspaper report as follows:
A rally held by the National Socialist Movement in Trafalgar Square yesterday afternoon
ended in fighting between members of a crowd
of several hundreds shouting "Down with Fascism" and "Remember Belsen" and members
of the party who were attempting to leave the
square.
Throughout the meeting the speakers... were
continually shouted down and pelted with pennies, tomatoes, and rotten eggs, by an overwhelmingly hostile crowd of some 2,000. The
few people who did raise their hands in an
earnest Nazi salute looked distinctly nervous.
Twice the crowd, inflamed by the speeches from
the platform--several women were in tearsbroke through a police cordon guarding the
base of Nelson's Column. On both occasions
Acting Chief Superintendent Gilbert [commanding the police detachment] stopped the meeting
to allow tempers to cool but, after brief conferences with Mr. Jordan [leader of the movement] who claimed that the disturbances were
only caused by a "handful of Reds", the meeting
continued.n
At this meeting twenty members of the crowd
were arrested for breach of the peace, conduct
likely to cause a breach of the peace, or assault
on the police. The leader, Colin Jordan, and the
secretary, John H. Tyndall, of the National
Socialist Movement were subsequently convicted
for using "threatening, abusive or insulting words
or behaviour with intent to provoke a breach of
the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace is
likely to be occasioned," contrary to section 5,
of the Public Order Act, 1936.0 Part of the case
for the prosecution was that during the course of
the speeches at the meeting Jordan had said, "On
September, 3rd., 1939, the blackest day in British
history, the long and intensive Jewish campaign
was crowned with success and the Jews of the
world rejoiced," and Tyndall had said, "In our
democratic society the Jew is like a poisonous
maggot feeding on a body in an advanced state of
decay." 31 Both were convicted, Jordan being
sentenced to two months' imprisonment and
Tyndall to six weeks' imprisonment. On SeptemJuly 1962, p. 12, col. 3
10R v Jordan and Tyndafl, Bow Street Magistrates'
Court, reported in the LoNDoN Tinmss, August 1962,
p. 4, col. 4
aIIbid.
29Ibid,
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ber 4, 1962, however, the London Sessions Appeal
Committee allowed Jordan's appeal against his
conviction and, in allowing Tyndall's appeal
against sentence, substituted a fine of ten pounds
(approximately $30) for the sentence of six weeks'
imprisonment. Mr. R. E. Seaton, Chairman of the
Appeals Committee, stated that the speeches of
the two men had been very closely considered and
whereas that of Jordan was "very, very near the
borderline but just fails to step over the edge.
Tyndall's speech is much more vitriolic.11n The
Metropolitan police prosecutors asked the Sessions
court to state a case for the decision of the Divisional Court and, in ruling that Jordan's conviction
should stand, the Queen's Bench Division held
that for the purposes of section 5 of the Public
Order Act a person must take his audience as he
finds them, even assuming "that the persons present are a body of hooligans" and, if the words that
he uses to a particular audience, or part of such
audience, are in fact likely to provoke a breach of
the peace, then he is guilty of an offence under
section 5. It would be wrong to ignore the feelings of some members of the audience merely
because they were intent on breaking up the meeting whatever words the speaker used. Jordan's
words were intended to be, and were, deliberately
insulting to the body of persons who were being
restrained by the police.
In this case, doctrines which were particularly
obnoxious to the British public had been expressed
but it is noteworthy that, judging by the newspaper reference to "tomatoes and rotten eggs",
some members of the audience had gone to the
meeting fully prepared to cause a disturbance.
This factor was all the more significant in the
subsequent disturbances of the summer because
there was no evidence at these later meetings of
inflammatory language on the part of the speakers.
The unpopularity of the organisers was due merely
to the antecedents of the movements concerned
and their associations with European Fascism.
Nevertheless, it was evident that certain elements
of the audiences at these meetings were present for
the express purpose of breaking up the meetings.
So numerous and effective were these people that
the police, in their desire to avoid bloodshed, had
little alternative but to stop the meetings soon
after they had commenced. The particular difficulty facing the police at these incidents was the
1'LoNDoN Tnms,

September 5, 1962, p. 5, col. 1
Jordan v Burgoyne (1963) 2 all E.R. 225, per Lord
Parker, C.J.
3
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fact that the vast majority of onlookers were
antagonistic to the organisers of the meetings
even before a word was spoken, and it is interesting
to note that the police were later criticised for the
use of police dogs in dispersing troublemakers.
In the second major incident of the summer
(a meeting of Sir Oswald Mosley's Union Movement, in Trafalgar Square, on Sunday, July
22, 1962), fifty-five people were arrested and the
meeting stopped by the police, of whom there were
three hundred present, after only fifteen minutes.
In the words of a newspaper report which appeared
the following day:
Although the meeting was not due to begin
until 3 p.m. a' crowd estimated at 6,000 had
almost filled the square by 2:30. Many of
these were sightseers but a group of 200 or 300
at the front, held back by the police cordon surrounding the plinth, had dearly come to break
the meeting up.M
The next disturbance, again involving the
Union Movement, occurred some two hundred
miles from London, in connection with a procession
and meeting in Manchester. In the presence of
two hundred and fifty policemen and a crowd of
4,000 people the meeting was abandoned on
police advice after seventeen minutes of continuous
uproar during which forty-seven arrests were
made. The following graphic description of the
scene is typical of reports which appeared in the
national newspapers the following day:
Police had to clear a way as the procession
quickly degenerating into a protracted brawl,
slowly inched... toward the mining suburb
of Bradford...
The site ear-marked for the meeting... had
been railed off overnight and the surging crowd
of people, many chanting "Down with Mosley",
found themselves penned by police with linked
arms in narrow streets and back alleys ... with
only a dozen or so surviving marchers in the
centre to listen to the speeches ....
Even with the aid of a dozen mounted men,
police had difficulty restraining the surging
crowds. A number of arrests were made to the
fury of the watchers, with struggling youths
being manhandled to waiting police vans.35
Two days later, London again became the focal
point when Sir Oswald Mosley addressed a Union
Movement rally in Dalston, East London-an
34

LomNoN TIms, July 23, 1962, p. 10, col. 6
35Iid, July 30, 1962, p. 6, col. 1
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area with a large Jewish population. A petition
delivered on the preceding day to the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police by the Mayor
and Mayoress of Hackney (the Metropolitan
borough concerned), two members of Parliament,
and four members of the London County Council,
calling for a ban on the meeting had proved abortive. This was necessarily so because the Commissioner has no power to ban a meeting in advance
even though, once started, a meeting can in most
cases be stopped if it appears likely that a breach
of the peace is about to take place.
Once more, a large detachment of some two
hundred foot police and ten mounted policemen
was present, but the meeting was stopped after
only three minutes of the main address. Attempts
had been made to rush the platform; rotten fruit,
stones, pennies, and pieces of wood were thrown;
and a local Alderman and his wife were struck
with an iron bar as a result of which they both
required medical treatment. Following the fracas,
in respect of which twenty-one people were later
fined a total of thirty-three pounds ten shillings
(approximately $100), it took the police another
hour to clear the road.36
Yet another Union Movement meeting in Dalston on September 1, 1962, was stopped by the
police after only two minutes of the main address,
due to the activities of a hostile audience. On this
occasion, despite the presence of nearly 1,000
policemen and the arrests of more than forty
people, several people were injured."
Ainercan Disturbances. The same constitutional
problem has resulted in disturbances of similar
magnitude in the United States in recent years.
On August 27, 1949, a Paul Robeson concert
was arranged to take place on private property
near Peekskill, New York. Following adverse
newspaper reports that the concert was to be
sponsored by a Communist front organisation,
the local inhabitants were exhorted to show their
determined disapproval of the concert. Certain
inhabitants who adopted a civil libertarian attitude
towards the concert were subjected to terrorisation, and on the night of the concert hostile groups
blocked the roads into the area where it was to be
held. The result was that only a limited number of
would-be concertgoers were able to reach the
actual concert area. There was no evidence of
violence by the concertgoers themselves, but a
26 llb, August 1, 1962, p. 10, col. 6
-7Ibid, September 2, 1962, p. 6, col. 7

melee took place at the site, during which one
person was stabbed and considerable property
was burned. Although the sponsoring organisation
had made an advance request for assistance from
the New York State Attorney General there were
no more than six policemen on the scene until two
hours after the disturbance had commenced. The
indications were that a greater show of police
strength earlier in the evening might well have
avoided the more serious consequences of the incident. The Grand Jury, however, later vindicated
the police from all blame, holding that based on
previous experience the police precautions had been
adequate.
The Robeson concert was rearranged amid a
blaze of publicity with the result that an explosive
atmosphere prevailed on the day when the seconc
attempt was due to take place. Some 5,000 antiRobeson demonstrators were faced by 15,000
Robeson supporters who had brought along with
them their own guards. On hand to control these
rival factions were 750 members of the county
and state police departments. Violence was avoided
until after the performance when the police were
quite powerless to adequately cope with the rioting that took place. Despite the efforts of the police
many cars were damaged and more than a hundred
people injured.n
A more recent example of peaceful demonstrators being deprived of their freedom of assembly due to the activities of a hostile group occurred
in the March, 1960, anti-segregation demonstrations by college students in Montgomery, Alabama. On March, 1, 1960, a thousand Negro
students under police supervision walked two
abreast and in a peaceable manner from the campus to the capitol where they sang the Lord's
Prayer and the National Anthem. On this occasion there was no disturbance of any kind. A week
later, however, when the students gathered tW
repeat their orderly demonstration, this time from
a church to an anti-segregation prayer meeting,
they were faced by a crowd of 5,000 hostile whites.
Several hundred policemen were in attendance,
and they prevented a riot by confining the Negro
students to the area of the church. Even so, the
would-be marchers were attacked by their antagonists, and it was only with the assistance of
mounted deputies and fire trucks that the two
groups were separated and eventually dispersed.n
31 Abernathy, op. cit., pp. 43-48
1Thid, pp. 38-40
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Sensible police action in this case averted a serious
crisis, but in doing so it denied to 1,000 American
citizens their inherent freedom of assembly and
expression.

THE ROLE op

inn PoLICE

Throughout the foregoing discussion it has been
abundantly clear that the whole problem under
consideration revolves around a conflict between
two principles of the common law. On the one
hand is the notion that a lawful act does not become unlawful merely because the doing of it
may cause another to do an unlawful act, and on
the other is the duty of a police officer to prevent
any breach of the peace which he reasonably
apprehends. When a large and unruly mob attends
a public meeting with a determination to break
up the proceedings, the police are faced with a
very real dilemma. The police, in both England
and the United States, are well trained in their
duties as the guardians of civil rights, and so far
as freedom of assembly is concerned they are
instructed that their main responsibility is to
protect individuals and groups in the exercise of
this constitutional right. The powers apparently
afforded by the courts in Duncan v Jones and
Feiner v People of New York are very seldom invoked, but when a police detachment is overwhelmingly outnumbered by a disorderly crowd
at a public meeting, and the situation seems likely
to become beyond control, the instinctive reaction
of the officer in charge is to take the only remaining course within his legal powers to avoid a major
breach of the peace. At which point can a compromise be made? In the one extreme, the rights of
the meeting organisers must be protected at all
costs. Such costs would indeed be high, both in
terms of police manpower and, if the hostile audience were sufficiently determined, in bloodshed.
The other extreme would be to stop any public
meeting as soon as a police officer present reasonably apprehends a breach of the peace. Once again,
the cost would be high, but this time in terms of the
denial of civil liberties.
The leading cases, discussed above, have drawn
the line of compromise at various points between
these two extremes, and in two cases in particular
the courts have favoured the extreme measure
placing the onus on police discretion."
In enforcing a branch of the law where there
4 Duncan v Jones, supra; Feiner v People of New
York, supra.
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are so many variables, what then are the police to
do? The first task is to consider the nature of the
language used by the speakers, together with the
circumstances or place in which the meeting is
held. If violence or a breach of the peace on the
part of the audience would be the natural and
foreseeable consequence, it is clearly the duty of
the police to stop the meeting and consider legal
proceedings against the speakers and organisers.
It is equally dear, however, that in the absence of
such a degree of provocation on the part of the
speakers, or organisers, the duty of the police is
to do everything within their power to ensure that
the meeting is allowed to proceed, and to take
strong action against troublemakers. It may be
necessary to deploy large numbers of police officers
at the scene, and in the case of a large gathering of
people it would be advisable for one squad to be
specially detailed to locate and arrest the ringleaders of any groups inciting other members of
the audience to violence. It was illustrated in
London during the 1962 disturbances that such
large scale arrests can be facilitated by the police
holding in readiness a small fleet of private buses
for the transportation of prisoners from the scene.
When it becomes apparent in all communities that
such determined action will be taken by the police
against all unruly mobs, and that the enormous
police expenditure involved will have to be met
from local taxes, the townspeople will gradually
realise that the best method to deal with unpopular
speakers is to shun their meetings altogether. No
one is under any obligation to attend such a meeting.
Circumstances frequently arise where a breach
of the peace in connection with a procession or
meeting can be confidently anticipated by a Chief
of Police. It then becomes his duty to exercise
any legal powers vested in him to control such
procession or meeting. The consistent and unprejudiced use of existing bylaws and permit
ordinances to restrict provocative meetings, together with the stringent enforcement of obstruction ordinances and the arrest of all persons guilty
of disorderly conduct, are devices by which the
current law allows the police to minimise the risk
of public disturbances. Formal censorship, in the
exceptional cases where it is permitted by law,
is far more satisfactory than the risk of extensive
civil disorder. It is essential, however, that in the
training of police officers, great emphasis should
continue to be placed on their duty, in the case of a
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lawfully conducted meeting, to aim their controlling and preventive activities at potential troublemakers in the audience rather than towards the
innocent organisers who are merely exercising a
constitutional right.
The disturbances already described are ample
evidence of the immense difficulty facing the police
in carrying out their duties in such situations. The
fact remains, however, that if mob violence is
allowed to become accepted as an unofficial censor
of public speeches and assemblies, our much lauded
freedom of assembly is completely valueless.
People responsible for disorder at public gather-

ings are generally motivated either by an inherent
antisocial complex or by intense passion arising
from the assembly itself. In either case a nominal
punishment is not likely to be sufficient to deter
the offender from repeating his violent conduct at
subsequent meetings of a similar nature. On the
other hand, exemplary punishment will not only
deter the individual concerned but will also indicate to othet citizens, who may be tempted to
take the law into their own hands, that a keen
sense of joint responsibility is felt by the police
and the judiciary in maintaining the status quo
of civil rights.

